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Abstract

In a competitive two-country ·overlapping generations model with perfect
capital mobility, a plan that is individually Pareto optimal (that is Pareto
optimal with respect to individual preferences) can be sustained without
1

coordination of national fiscal policies when the fiscal arsenal is restricted
to ,lump-sum taxes: and government borrowing.

Cooperation is required to

achieve a Pareto optimum with respect to the two utilitarian national social
welfare functions.

Cooperation and international side payments are required

to .achieve ..an-: optimum·.•.with.respect to a utilitarian global ·1social ·welfare
function.
Without international lump-sum transfers, when distortionary taxes on
capital income are permitted, Pareto, optima with respect to national social
welfare functions and global social welfare optima will not be individual
Pareto: optima:; .ef.f:iciency. is traded-off .for. a.,more desirable intergenerational
and international distribution of resources.
With nationally provided international public goods, the achievement of
individual Pareto efficiency requires coordination of public spending but not
of financing.
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THE VELFARE ECONOMICS OF COOPERATIVE AND NONCOOPERA.TIVE FISCAL POLICY
llillem H. Buiter and Kenneth M. Kletzer

1.

INTRODUCTION
Full international integration of·. commodity and··· financial markets

appears to leave little scope for countries to adopt policies to gain
national advantage in world markets.

Under free trade and unified tax

regimes the set of fiscal policies available to national policy makers is
severely limited.

In the absence of Ricardian equivalence however lump-sum

transfers between households within a country can alter the pattern of
national saving and.consumption, allowing a government to exploit the
country's size in world trade, and international lending and borrowing.
The use of intergenerational transfers between citizens for pursuing
nationalistic welfare objectives is studied in an overlapping generations
economy.

Redistribution across generations either through balanced-budget

unfunded social security retirement schemes or public sector
v··

-'-deficit-finance. with lump- sum taxes and transfers allows a national planner
to affect the country's static and intertemporal terms of trade when trade
restrictions or discriminatory taxation of asset income by source or
residence are unavailable, say due to international agreements.
A_major issue is whether cooperative,,policy formation by governments
of interdependent economies is desirable for allocational efficiency.

The

absence of distortionary taxes implies that no overall loss in world
surplus need result from the strategic use of lump-sum transfers.

Lump-sum

intergenerational transfer schemes designed to attain national welfare
goals do not create departures from Pareto optimality in the world economy.

2

Such policies do effect redistributions of total surplus between foreign
residents and home country citizenry .
. Ve adopt an utilitarian objective for each.policy maker in a
two-country model which implies that.the.global .command optimum is-time
consistent . . It also implies that the national command optimum for a single
- country facing a passive second country will be time consistent provided a
sufficient set of distortionary tax instruments can be used.

The utility

of all current alive and yet to be born generations is discounted
exponentially to the present.

For simplicity, in all but one of our

examples, we assume that the social rate of discount is constant.

This

utilitarian social welfare function which is used by Calvo and Obstfeld
[1988] is similar to ones proposed by Samuelson [1967, 1968] but requires
no constraints on government behavior to assure time consistency of the
command optima.
The adoption of a social welfare function for the government in each
country introduces a distinction between intertemporal allocations which
. . ,are Pareto optimal .with .respect;.to all household preferences (the usual
sense) and ones which are Pareto optimal with respect to national policy
makers' preferences.

Because the national social welfare functions are

strictly utilitarian, optima with respect to planners' preferences are a
.subset of the full set of Pareto optima.

Lump-sum 1redistribution schemes-,,, ""·

under free trade and capital mobility chosen by utilitarian planners are
shown to assure that a competitive equilibrium allocation is a Pareto
optimum.

Because it does not benefit either social planner, dynamic

inefficiency of the equilibrium plan can be avoided using noncooperative
national lump-sum tax policies without international side payments.
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However, a noncooperative equilibrium in lump-sum tax and transfer plans
does not assure Pareto optimality.with respect to :national social planners' ,..
0

. preferences. Therefore coordination is not necessary-for allocational
efficiency in the standard Pareto sense but is required to attain
efficiency with.respect to.policy makers' preferences.
In our analysis we allow only intertemporal international trade that
is borrowing and lending or international trade in claims on capital stocks
(these are equivalent in this model).

The generalization to study the

effects of lump-sum tax policies on the commodity terms of trade in each
period is contained in Buiter and Kletzer [1990b].

The impact of lump-sum

taxation in the absence of Ricardian equivalence on key relative prices is
demonstrated with only one relative price, the world interest- -rate, each
period. Ve assume that capital is perfectly mobile internationally. ve·
also assume away any ability of individual.governments to use national
seigniorage to finance fiscal deficits by studying a nonmonetary economy.
In the second section the two-country model and notation are
.introduced. The welfare .economics of coordinated and uncoordinated fiscal
policies are discussed in the third section. Three criteria are presented.
The first is Pareto optimality with respect to household preferences, the
second is Pareto optimality with respect to the two national planners'
preferences, and the third is optimality with •.respect to a global
utilitarian social welfare objective.

If only lump-sum taxes and transfers

between households within each country-separately are allowed (that is-each
national authority is subject to a national solvency constraint without any
international side payments), then a noncooperative equilibrium choice of
policies achieves a Pareto optimal allocation of resources with respect to
individual household preferences.

Coordination between governments in the
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selection of these fiscal policies is necessary in general to attain a
· Pareto optimum with respect to :the two national planners' objectives ·in a·, ,,,
competitive equilibrium with free capital mobility. llliile separate but
• coordinated fiscal policies are necessary -to achieve nationalistic planner--,··..
Pareto efficiency, ,optimization.of global objectives· requires international
lump-'sumtransfers.

If these are infeasible, there are two sets·of

policies that can be used to pursue the global second-best.

The first

involves the use of lump-sum national intergenerational redistribution to
influence the world rate of interest and thus the international
distribution of income between debtors and creditors.

In addition, the

international distribution of income can be altered by policies which
affect the payments to the internationally immobile factor, labor in this
model.

Wage differentials are created by subsidizing investment in one

country and trucing it in the other in the presence of perfect capital
mobility.
Throughout this paper, we allow unrestricted age-dependent lump-sum
. ,/!.

✓.¥"·'nationaL(truc"''and*..transfer.

schemes in our analysis.

In Buiter and Kletzer

[1990a] we show that in an infinite-horizon economy fiscal policies
composed of age-independent lump-sum truces and transfers with deficit
finance subject to a suitable public sector solvency constraint are
entirely equivalent to (balanced budget)•unfunded.social security
retirement schemes. That is each set of policies supports the same set of
intertemporal consumption plans.

As Calvo and Obstfeld [1988] show,

age-independent transfer schemes which are optimal for the utilitarian
. planner require an infinite-horizon economy to ensure that they are also
time-consistent (see also, Hillier and Malcomson [1984]).
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Following Vilson [1981], and O'Connell and Zeldes [1988], Calvo and
Obstfeld demonstrate. that in the case-of,the -optimal,lump- sum tax policy,
with age-independent transfers the usual form of the government solvency
constraint does not hold.

Therefore, as in Buiter and Kletzer [1990a], we

, modify the solvency constraints to allow deficit-financed.age-' independent·.
0

transfer and tax schemes.
The fourth section analyzes optimum policy for a single country with
national chauvinistic utilitarian objectives facing a passive country.
Vith unrestricted distortionary and lump-sum fiscal instruments, the
national first-best is attained through a combination of a tax on interest
received by residents from foreigners or interest paid by residents to
foreigners and an unfunded social security retirement scheme (or its
equivalent with age-independent transfers).

The borrowing/lending tax is

the intertemporal equivalent of the optimum tariff in this model.

The

optimum policy package is time-consistent for the national utilitarian
planner because distortionary taxes are introduced in addition to
,<-;.,unrest;cictedc,lump-.,sum.,tax and .transfer policies.

In, this model, the

national command optimum is achieved so that the standard
time-inconsistency problem in the overlapping generations economy with
potential capital levies does not arise (see Fischer [1980], Kydland and
Prescott [1980], Turnovsky and -Brock [1980], and,,Chamley '[1985]).

Ve next

derive the optimal unfunded social security policy when no distortionary
tax instruments are allowed and show that lump-sum tax policies can target
both intergenerational distribution objectives and interest rate
objectives.

The trade-off between these two objectives targetted by a

single instrument is discussed.

The (constrained) national optimum in this

case is not in general time consistent.
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In the .fifth section, we introduce technological externalities in
·public policy .formation by adding internationally enjoyed public goods.·--·A
world Pareto optimum with respect to-household preferences requires
cooperative exhaustive public spending programs. · Public goods-provision~ ts
inefficient .under noncooperative behavior by national chauvinistic social
·:-,planners in general. ·However attainment of· a Pareto optimum does· not
require that the financing of public expenditures be coordinated, just the
level of such expenditures at each date.

As before, a Pareto optimal plan

with respect to planners' preferences does in general require cooperation
. in financing plans as well.

2.

THE IODEL

The model economy is a two-country version of the Diamond [1965]
overlapping generations model with capital accumulation following Buiter
[1981].

A country is defined by two characteristics.

First there is a

factor of production (labor) that is immobile between countries.
ir,,'. .

Second

,ea.ch country .has.,a.fiscal authority whose ability to tax residents may
differ from its ability to tax nonresidents and/or whose ability to tax
domestic sources of income may differ from its ability to tax foreign
sources of income.

These very general "boxes" will be filled with specific

examples in what follows.
Each generation survives for two periods, and the economy has an
infinite horizon.

The populations of the two countries, home and foreign,·
"'

are equal in size, growing at the same constant proportional rate n.
Vithin each country the households are homogeneous, but tastes and initial
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wealth differ across borders.

A constant returns to scale technology,

· which may be country- specific, is' available-to perfectly competitive -firms
producing a single output.
There is a public sector in each country which can effect
.... ,-- -, .intergenerational transfers between members of its-own population--··-_,.
(currently alive or yet to be born), levy distortionary taxes and provide
publicly consumed goods.

Each government is represented by a single player

possessing a national social welfare function which it seeks to maximize
observing a suitable solvency constraint (discussed below).
sovereigndefault·risk.

There is no

Taxes and subsidies can be levied on domestic

investment, foreign asset income received by domestic residents or payments
. to foreign investors •._. There also can be lump-,- sum trans£ers to and taxes on
domestic households that do not represent immediate direct
intergenerational trans~_ers.

Any budget deficits or surpluses are financed

by issuing or retiring one-period real government debt.
The utility function for a representative household of each generation
,. -t,\ .,.,.;,-

in both countries.;;,is _assumed, to, be intertemporally additively separable,
and, without loss of generality, the single-period felicity functions are
assumed identical between periods and generations within a country.

The

utility for a household in the home country which is young at time tis

(1)

where.. c! is consumption at time t of the household when young, c! is
consumption at time t+l of the household when old, and the discount rate p
is between zero and one.

Collective consumption is not considered in the
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next two sections, as reflected in (1).

Public goods are introduced in an

additively separable manner-'in·-Section 5•. •The utility function for the-···
counterpart household in the foreign country is

where asterisks indicate foreign variables and parameters.

The felicity

* are twice continuously differentiable, increasing
functions u(c) and u*(c)
and strictly concave.

(2)

Further, we assume that

lim u'(c)
c...:i O

= oo,

and lim u'(c)
c...:im

with corresponding Inada conditions-for u*

=0

The home country production

function in intensive form is given by

where y and k denote per capita output and capital, respectively, for the
home country.

f is twice continuously differentiable, increasing and

strictly concave, and the Inada conditions are assumed to hold.

The

foreign production function, assumed to have the same properties as f

is

National wealth for the home country,is the sum of the domestic
capital stock and net claims on foreigners h minus home government debt b.
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We do not need to distinguish between direct foreign investment and foreign
lending because they are perfect substitutes in this model.
At time t, total world output is divided between current consumption
and capital stocks for period t+l.

Either country's output can be used to

form capital for the next period .in .either country. . However existing -·- · ..•• ,, ..
capital stocks cannot be reallocated across borders for producing current
outputs.
The budget constraint for a young household at time tin the home
country under free capital mobility is

(3)

where r t+l is the world rate of interest, wt
the wage rate,

= w(kt) = f(kt) - ktf' (kt) is

rI is the lump- sum tax paid while young, and r! is the

· lump- sum tax paid while old.

The competitive household maximizes (1) with

respect to its consumption plan c{ and c! subject to (3), taking as given
wt , rt+l ,

r{ and r!.

Household saving by the young and consumption by

the old in the home country are given by

(4)

and

(5)

The equilibrium conditions for the home private sector are
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and

in addition to (4) and (5).

The equilibrium conditions for the foreign

private sector can be obtained by attaching asterisk superscripts to home
country functions and variables.
In the presence of home country taxes on borrowing or lending abroad,

r must be replaced by the sum of the world interest rate and the tax rate
on foreign investment income or payments in both (6) and (7).

If fixed

capital formation in the home country receives a subsidy, then r must be
replaced by the world interest rate minus the subsidy rate in (7) alone.
A national income accounting identity yields

where xt is the per capita primary external deficit (or trade deficit) for
the home country.
The material balance constraint for the world economy is

(9)
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Under the assumptions made, ,a competitive equilibrium for this economy
* and given· ,
exists given k 0 and positive initial- capital.•stocks i,k 0 and ·ko",
that all distortionary taxes are linear.

3. -

PAB.ETD OPTilllL POLICIES

- In the two-country overlapping generations model, a competitive
equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal unless the equilibrium growth path
is dynamically inefficient.

In Buiter and Kletzer [1990a] it is shown that

fiscal policy using only nondistortionary instruments can assure a Pareto
optimum.

If arbitrary age-dependent lump-sum transfers are feasible, then

efficiency can be achieved through the use of separate balanced budget
fiscal policies in each-country .. That is balanced budget intergenerational
transfer schemes for each country separately suffice.

Under free capital

mobility, unfundedsocial security.retirement schemes in each country-do
not need to be coordinated to assure a Pareto optimum with respect to
household preferences.
"When arbitrary unfunded social security policies are available,
relaxing the constraint that the public sector budget be balanced in every
period provides no additional ability to either government for achieving
national welfare objectives.

However, if restrictions are placed on the

contemporaneous intergenerational transfers that can be made, then
deficit-financing (or surplus accumulations) increases the instruments
available to policy makers.
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It.is important.to note that the proposition that free international
capital mobility and "uncoordinated,··unfunded ·social security-programs ~for-,·• -
each of the two countries are capable of ensuring that a competitive
economy attains a Pareto optimal equilibrium allocation refers to Pareto·.
·optimality with respect ·to the•individual household's preferences. ·In what ,·,,
follows the expressions "Pareto optimal" or "Pareto efficient" when used
without qualification will always mean "Pareto optimal" (or Pareto
efficient) with respect to the utility functions of current and future
individual households.

In this paper, we introduce a utilitarian objective

function for the social planner in each country and show that with free
capital mobility and separate unfunded social security retirement schemes a
Pareto optimum with respect to the nationalistic preferences of the two
planners can be achieved provided these separate1 tax-transfer schemes are
coordinated.

A noncooperative equilibrium-using only lump-sum instruments

will still yield a Pareto optimum with respect to household preferences,
but not with respect to national chauvinistic utilitarian planners'
r.:, .

preferences. ...None oL.these policies will, in general, be time- consistent.
In an unrestricted, unfunded social security scheme the budget
constraint for the home country each period is given by

(10)

1

'Tt

+

2
r t-1

T+n

= 0.

The effect of age-dependent lump- sum transfers is ·to '·change the saving ·of····
the current young, altering the level of wealth for the next period.
In the open economy, a reduction in aggregate (world) saving is required if
the equilibrium path for the competitive laissez-faire economy is
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dynamically inefficient.

This is achieved.by taxing the young and

subsidizing the consumption of~ the ·old .·in at least- one of ·,the :countries .. · ·
(possibly it is·necessary in both).
The following result is proved in Buiter and Kletzer [1990a].

Proposition 1

A Pareto optimal plan can be attained as a competitive equilibrium
allocation under free capital mobility and unfunded social security
schemes.

Coordination of the latter is unnecessary.

,Note that Proposition 1 does not say that a competitive equilibrium
allocation under perfect capital mobility will be Pareto efficient for any
set of national unfunded social security schemes.

Clearly, there may.be

unfunded national social security schemes ·that support a dynamically
inefficient equilibrium.

It does say that there exist uncoordinated

unfunded national social security schemes that support a Pareto optimum.
Suppose that a national planner possesses an utilitarian welfare
function of the following form over the consumption plans of the home
country's residents:

CD

(11)

St=

L U: ;]i[u(c~+i) + /Ju(c~+i)] + U: h]Pu(c~_

1)

i=O

where pis the social generational discount rate of the planner.

This

function is analogous to the social welfare objective used by Calvo and
Obstfeld [1988] in the closed economy.
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The foreign planner seeks to maximize

In each of these functions the felicity of the current old is included and
discounted at exactly the same rate as felicity while old of the current
young or unborn.

This is necessary if an unrestricted national command

optimum is to be time-consistent (compare with Samuelson [1967, 1968]).
Free international capital mobility and balanced budget age-dependent
, transfer schemes for each country are adequate policy instruments to attain
a Pareto optimum with respect, to these national welfare criteria.

Proposition 2

A Pareto optimum is achievable with respect to the national social
welfare objectives Sand S* under perfect competition and free capital
....mobility.,using separate national unfunded social security retirement
schemes (that is schemes that are balanced nation-by-nation without
international transfers).

Proof

A Pareto optimum with respect to Sand S* , given initial capital
stocks and initial net foreign assets, is found by maximizing the
Lagrangean given below for some J

~

O.

15

s0 + .1s; +

i

vJJ(k 1) + / (k~) + kt + k~ - (1 + n)kt+J - (1 + n)k~+J

t=O

This yields the interior first-order conditions given in equations (13a)
through (14c), the restrictions on the values of the Lagrange multipliers
along an optimal path given in (15a, b, c) and the transversality
.conditions ensuring dynamic efficiency given in (15d, e).

{13a)

(13b)

(13c)
{14a)

(14b)

(14c)

(15a)

(15b)
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(15c)

Vt> 0 for all t

(15d)

(15e)

Competitive individual lifetime optimization in both countries and
perfect international financial capital mobility ensure that equations
(.13a, b,,.c.)_.holcL ..National intergenerational transfers satisfying
2

*2

1
r~l
*1
rt 1
rt+ 1 + n = 0 and rt + 1 +- n = 0 are enough to ensure that equations
(14a, b) hold, since from the two household budget constraints it follows
2
*2
that there are always two instruments, rt+l
and rt+l
, to use to satisfy

(14a, b) given prior choices of

rt

1 and

r:!

1

There will also be some

nonnegative Pareto weight or national distributional weight A that
satisfies (14c).

It is easily checked that this Pareto weight will be

constant over time.
cooperative behavior.

Dynamic inefficiency is obviously ruled out with
It would in fact be ruled out even with Nash

behavior, as it will always be in the interest of each national policy
maker to transfer more resources to its own old (even unilaterally) if the
interest rate were permanently below the growth

rate. □

The policy choices for the home and foreign government are
interdependent and must be made cooperatively to attain a Pareto optimum
with respect to the two national social welfare functions.

This point can

be seen by noting that (14c) is obtained from the-following two first-order
conditions for optimization of the Lagrangean in the above proof:
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t
[1 + n ] u, ( c{) =
1 + p

flt ' and

With noncooperative behavior (for instance with Nash behavior) these
equations will not hold in general, because the two national players will
not be facing the same shadow prices of capital.

They will hold if the two

national social welfare functions and the two national private sector
production functions and utility functions are identical, if the initial
values of k and k* are the same and if the initial value of his zero .
. Note that in Proposition 2 the weight on foreign social welfare ,\ is,
constant over all generations.

In the individual Pareto problem (referred·

to in Proposition 1) there can be a· separate weight for every generation in· ··
0

each country. lie summarize this discussion as follows.

Corollary

Under free capital mobility, separate national unfunded social
security retirement schemes must be chosen cooperatively to ensure
that a Pareto optimum with respect to the national social welfare
functions is attained as a competitive equilibrium allocation.

The alternative of deficit-financed lump-sum transfer payments to
-households-currently alive or budget surpluses to finance future transfers
will only add to government's effective arsenal of fiscal instruments if
restrictions are imposed on the scope of age-dependent transfer plans.

In

the closed infinite-horizon economy, Calvo and Obstfeld [1988] show that if
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the transfers made to (or taxes paid by) the two generations living at any
date must be equal, then public debt management is capable of ensuring that
a competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient..

In Buiter and

Kletzer [1990a] we extend this proposition to a two-county setting.

Ve

show that if there always is a next period (that is if the economy goes on
forever), the ·ability ·•of each government to transfer from the current old
to the current young with national balanced budgets is an adequate policy
instrument to attain a Pareto efficient global capital accumulation path.
However, the sign of the transfer to the private sector from the public
sector can switch back and forth between periods in an efficient
age-independent lump-sum tax and transfer scheme, implying that government
debt at each date may, form.. a nonconvergent sequence.

An adequate

reformulation of the government solvency constraint is the following.
just lump- sum taxes and transfers·· the budget identity of the home
government is:
2
( 1 + n) bt+ _ (1 + rt) bt - rt1 - ( 1 + n)-1 rt1
1

Here bt is home country government debt per member of home country
generation t. Therefore, for T ~ 0 we have 2 :
T-1
b1

= (1 +
T-1

+

II

n) -1~ -

£.J

t=O
(1 +

nrlu

+ ri)bo .

i=l
Ve require that the sequence {b 1}T=O possesses a convergent infinite

:With
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subsequence {b 1 _}f .=Osuch that the limit, as j goes to infinity of

J J

T .-1
T.-1[J
b1_(1 + n) J

IIu

J

+

ri)

]-1

, is nonpositive.

The following proposition

i=O

follows immediately.

Proposition 3

Under free capital mobility, age-independent transfer schemes which
observe the modified public sector solvency constraint in each country
can be found to assure that a competitive equilibrium allocation is a
Pareto optimum with respect to the two national·planners' preferences.

Proof

The argument is almost identical to that for Proposition 2 and to the
argument in Buiter and Kletzer [1990a] showing that age-independent
lump-sum transfers can support a Pareto optimum with respect to individual
household preferences.

The revised public sector solvency constraint is

satisfied if the net discounted transfers to each generation (discounted to
birth) do not grow faster than the interest rate.
be assured without violating this

Dynamic efficiency can

restriction. □

Corollary

The public sector deficit-financing policies of the two governments
require coordination, in general, to assure that a national social
welfare Pareto optimum is attained for the planners as a competitive
equilibrium with free capital mobility.
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Another question which might be asked is what policy instruments are
required to maximize a global utilitarian planner's objectives? In this
case, a single .function is defined over the utilities of, successive·
generations in both countries which can be written:

{16)

where {fi

.J and

J

* are weights on the utilities of every household in the
{fi.}
J

two populations respectively.

These weights can be different for each

generation in each country. Ve assume that O <

~ {c1 + n)i

ll n;}

~ {(1 + n)' J:1 nj}

< ro.

For time consistency of the global command optimum, it is in addition
i

required that the generational discount factors (1 + n)i

IJ nj
1·=0

and

21

.II nJ°
i

(1 + n) i

·

* decline exponentiallrwith i ·. · This implies

j=O

o<

(1

+

n)nj, (1

+

n)n * < 1 for j
1

Clearly maximization of

~

o.

sf (for given household weights n1 and n1),

subject to thecglobalmaterial,balance constraint in ..generalarequires

lump- sum transfers between the two populations .. A global social welfare
command optimum can only be supported as a competitive equilibrium with
perfect international capital mobility if the fiscal authorities use both
intergenerational transfers within each country (for example, either
balanced-budget age-dependent lump-sum transfers or age-independent
lump-sum transfers with deficits and surpluses observing the modified
public sector solvency constraints) and lump- sum internationaLtransfers.
The necessary conditions for a global social welfare optimum
include--in addition to the conditions governing the behavior of the shadow
price of capital given in (15a-e)--the following:

(17a)

(17b)

(17c)

(17d)

(17e)

*1
0*t+1+iu *'(ct+l+i)
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(f7f)

. The, first three ofthese are satisfied in any competitive -•equilibrium
with perfect international capital mobility.

The fourth condition.

characterizes optimality with respect to the global social welfare function
of the intergenerational distribution of resources within the home country.
The fifth characterizes optimality of the intergenerational distribution of
resources within the foreign country.

The last condition characterizes

optimality(in terms of the global social welfare function) of the
international (or intragenerational) distribution of resources.

This last

condition implies that an international lump-sum transfer plan is, in
general, required in addition to individual national unfunded social
security policies to assure that .competitive equilibrium allocations are
global social welfare optima.

There must be scope for lump-sum

redistribution between all economic agents alive at the same time, not just
Ne: :;

>

among the economic .agents belonging to disjoint (national) subsets of the
total world population.

Only in rather uninteresting special cases (such

as identical private utility functions and productions functions; identical
initial capital stocks; zero initial net foreign assets, and equal
valuation of home and foreign consumers in the global social welfare
* for all i)) will the achievement of the global
function (nt+i = nt+i

command optimum not require lump-sum international redistribution.
Vhen the global planner is restricted to follow national
balanced-budget policies using lump-sum intergenerational redistribution
only, neither the first-order condition for (unrestricted) international
distributional optimality (17f) nor the two first-order conditions for
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(unrestricted) national intergenerational distributional optimality
(17d, e) will in general be satisfied.. Policies that influence the
intergenerational distribution of,.resources -inevitably influence the world
. rate. of interest.

Typically-,.• -as shown in -Buiter ,and .Kletzer [l990a~ , •· ·

redistribution towards the old will· raise the rate of ·interest.- -,-Even in an
endowment economy without endogenous capital formation, an increase in the
rate of interest will redistribute resources from borrowers to lenders.
Therefore, unless the two countries happen to be in financial autarky
in each period, an increase in the rate of interest will redistribute
resources from one of them (the borrower) to the other (the lender).

The

restricted global planner will in general trade off at the margin the
intergenerational distribution objectives within each country against the
international distribution objectives.

In our model, the endogeneity of

the capital stock means that direct . "intergenerational redistribution in
period twill also .influence the wage income of agents born in period t+l.
If the two national production functions differ, this may provide another
rt1•' ,;

• •

means. through,,which. the restricted global planner can pursue its
international distributional objectives.
The ability to effect international lump-sum transfers is indeed
likely to be limited. We already discussed the possibility of using
national intergenerational redistribution through-lump-sum taxes and
transfers to influence capital formation and thus the wages paid to labor,
the internationally immobile factor.

A second-best approach to maximizing

global social welfare objectives without the ability to effect lump-sum
international transfers may well involve the use of any available
distortionary tax and transfer instruments to influence the competitive
payments to internationally immobile factors of production.

Since in our
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model labor is immobile across borders while new capital can be located in
either country, a tax on or .subsidy to .-investment -in one -country wilLcause -<:
the two, countries.' wage .rates to diverge. .Shifting capital between
countries redistributes income.•between the"-young -of ,the·-two •countries·· ,,,_ , ,-,.,,
through the payments to labor.. -. Country- specific fiscal policies ,(e.g.
lump-sum intergenerational redistribution, if available) which observe
suitably modified public sector solvency constraints can then be used to
distribute these altered national wages across generations within each
population.

The use of distortionary instruments to achieve "indirect" net

international ·wealth-transfers is of course at most second best and would
not be resorted to -if lump-sum international redistribution were an option.
Ve now derive the constrained optimal policy combination for the
global social planner without direct international redistribution (whether
through lump-sum or distortionary taxes or transfers) but with
country-specific taxes on or subsidies to the rentals of capital and with
country-specific residence-based taxation of non-wage income.
w:c

Note that we

.wish to rule. out..alLdirect international redistribution between home
country and foreign country residents.

Since residents of either country

can own capital in both countries, we impose the restriction that all net
capital tax revenue collected from home country residents is redistributed
in lump-sum fashion only to home country residents and similarly for the
net capital tax revenue collected from foreign residents.

The constraints

to be ob~erved by the global planner are those of a competitive economy
with perfect international capital mobility.
The restricted global welfare optimum is·achieved,by maximizing SC -in
(16) by influencing investment and consumption in both countries through
the choice each period of the four lump-sum taxes

r! , r!_ 1 , r: 1 and
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*2
'ft1

*

, and the two

, the two capital income tax rates Ot and Ot

residence- based interest income tax rates µt and µt* , subject to the
following set of constraints.

(18)

f(kt+i·) + kt+i· + f *(k.t+i·) + kt*+1. - (1 +

(19)

1
f(kt+i·) - kt+i·l' (kt+i·) - rt · -

n) (kt. +1+1,.

2

+i

i

rt+i
+ r t+1+i - µt+1+i

2
ct +1,.
+ 1 +
rt+1+i - µt+1+i

· (20)

*2

ct +1,.
+ --------,-1 + rt+1+i - µt+1+i

(21)

·[U _/t+1,-)k*t +1,. + at +1,.kt +1,·]

+ µt +1,

= 0

*

+ kt. +1+~.)

1

> ct +i·
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"(22)

-[(1 -at

+ µ,*t +i

-)kt +i. + a*t +i.k*t +i·] = 0

+i

(2ij)

Equations (21) and (22) represent balanced-budget constraints for the
public sectors.

Since there are assumed to be lump-sum taxes and transfers

for national intergenerational redistribution (that is arbitrary unfunded
national social security programs), no generality is lost with the
assumption of ,a.balanced,budget.

The proportion of the capital stock

employed in the home country owned by home residents is at , and the
proportion of the capital stock employed in the foreign country owned by
foreign citizens is at* . Equations (21) and {22) reflect the restriction
that all tax revenue collected from home country residents is redistributed
in lump-sum fashion to this population only and similarly for foreign tax
revenues.

Wedges between the rates of interest received by foreign and

home households can be imposed.

The before-tax interest rater is the same

in both countries through the assumption of perfect international capital
mobility.

It equals the marginal product of capital net of capital income

taxes in the two countries:

rt= f'(kt) - Ot

=

* - Ot.
*
f *'(kt)

Private
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residents in the home country get an aftertax rate of return on their
financial assets of

rt -

µtwhile foreign_residents

*

earn·rt - µt •

For this economy, we establish the following proposition.

Proposition 4

In the absence of feasible international lump-sum transfers, the
second-best policy for the global utilitarian planner with access to
country-specific taxes on capital income and residence-based interest
taxes is to set a nonnegative tax on the returns to capital located in
one country and a nonpositive tax on the returns to capital located in
the other country, along with separate unfunded social security
schemes or their equivalent in each country.

Residence-based interest

taxes are not used.

Proof

Solve the Lagrange problem for the maximization of SC given in (16)
using constraints (18)-(25).

The necessary conditions for an optimum

include equations (26) through (31).

Vt , nt

and nt* are the Lagrange

multipliers for constraints (18), (21) and (22) respectively.
*

(26)

µt+i

(27)

[ int
r + i. + at + i.'l'lt
., + i. +

= µt+i = O
*
(1 - at +i.)'l'lt
., +i.] (Jt + i.
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(29)

~t+i+l

(30)

~t+i+l

*

=

(1 + n)(l + rt+i+l )

=

(l

+

n)(l

+

rt+i+l)

-1

-1

nt+i

*

nt+i

Equation (26) says that residence-based taxes on asset income are not
used in the restricted global optimum program.
effect any direct international transfer.

They obviously cannot

In addition they cannot be used

to move the two national capital intensities and thus the two national wage
· rates in opposite directions.

They can be used to influence the before-tax

world interest rate and thus the distribution of income between a debtor
•and a creditor nation, but that same objective can be achieved more
effectively using the other fiscal instruments.

There is no case for

distorting the global allocation of saving.
Because the three multipliers¢,~ and~ * must all be nonnegative at
the constrained optimum, there .will.in.general be.a~nonzero tax.or subsidy ..
to investment in at least one country. This follows from equations (27)
and (28) which imply
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The two capital tax rates will therefore never have the same signs (unless
they are both

zero). □

, There are two reasons why a global planner without access to lump-sum
international redistribution instruments may want to influence capital
formation using dist·ortionary ·taxes~-" ·First, ·such· polrcies ·will influence-·
the world rate of interest; to the extent that there is net foreign
investment, such changes in the world rate of interest will redistribute
income between residents of the debtor country and the creditor country.
Second, changes in the national capital stocks influence the wages received
by the future young generation in the two countries.
From equations (27) and (28) it can be seen that a distortionary tax
will not be imposed on the income from capital located in a country when
that country's capital stock of wholly owned by domestic residents:
if at= 0, and Ot*

=

Ot = 0

* 1 for all t we have
* O. Thus if. at= at=
0 if at=

* for all t , and the unrestricted command optimum will
rt= !'(kt)= f *'(kt)
prevail.
ti:«''•·

, .. ,

If ·there is never any net ownership of foreign assets·, real or

.financial . (which,,is..implied by--but does not. imply--the absence of gross
foreign ownership), there is no argument for changing the world rate of
interest in order to alter the global distribution of income between
debtors and creditors.

If there is no gross foreign ownership of real

capital, there also is no social return to trying to.change wages (the
income of the internationally immobile factor) by influencing physical
capital formation through distortionary ·taxes on the income from capital.
Vith perpetual financial autarky (gross and net) all domestic capital
formation must be financed out of domestic saving, and.the excess burden of
the distortion associated with the domestic capital formation process in a
country is borne exclusively by residents of that country.

In a closed
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economy distortionary taxes would not be used, and neither will they be
, used in this formally open but effectively ,.closed economy.
The second case where distortionary taxes will not be used in the
restricted global optimum is where the .shadow . ¥alues ofthe .separate
national public sector budget constraints are 'equal (Tit

=·

Tit* for all't).

This represents the case in which, in the unrestricted global optimum,
there never are any net lump-sum international transfers.
The remaining necessary conditions for the restricted global optimum
are given below.

u' ( cti)
- - - - - - - = 1 + rt +i+
. 1 =
ni+tu' (cti+1)
i

(1 + n) i

IJ nJ°u' (cti)

=

J°=O

plus the ..,usual .transversality conditions.
They are easily seen to reduce to the first-order conditions for the
unrestricted global optimum given in (17b through d) when Tit= Tit* for all
* 1 for all t the equations of motion for the shadow
t. Vb.en at= at=
prices are the same as in the unrestricted optimum, but the initial
conditions for

T/

and T/ * need not be the same.

As noted in the earlier discussion, a "distortionary" tax/subsidy
program is useful for global utilitarian social welfare optimization when
there is foreign ownership of capital in at least one country in
competitive equilibrium and the special case that no international lump-sum
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transfers are desired in the unrestricted optimization exercise does not
hold.
A tax on the earnings of home capital (with or without the feature
that any revenue collected from foreign owners of domestic capital is
returned to them as lump-sum payments) reduces the capital.stock -in.the
home country, depressing home wages and raising foreign wages.

This

imperfect substitute policy for international lump-sum transfers creates a
distortion by breaking the equality of the marginal productivities of
capital across borders.

In equilibrium, a least distortionary policy will

entail a positive subsidy to capital in one country and a positive tax on
capital earnings in the other, in the general case.

4.

POLICIES FOR ACHIEVING NATIONAL WELFARE OBJECTIVES
l&ile the policies necessary for a competitive equilibrium growth path

for the two- country economy under free financial capital mobility to be a
Pareto optimum do not need to be coordinated between governments, a Pareto
.optimum.with .resp.ect. t.o two utilitarian national planners' preferences and
a global social welfare optimum are attained only through coordinated
policy selection.

In this section we study the national optimal behavior

of a single national planner who takes as given current and future policy
choices of the other national planner.

Ve can look at this as an

intertemporal version of the familiar static trade policy analysis which
considers the interaction of an active, optimizing national policy maker
who exploits the country's size in the world market and a passive policy
maker who neither responds to the other country's policy measures nor
attempts to exploit his country's market power.

The passive country

(labeled "foreign" in what follows) is assumed not to have imposed any
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distortionary taxes or subsidies.

It may have an internal lump-sum

intergenerational redistribution ,scheme, 0 but this is assumed independent of ·
the,policies pursued·by the active home country policy maker.

Ve can of

course interpret the behavior of our "active" home country government as
noncooperative,,open-loop Nash"behavior.

To-characterize a,fuH Nash

·

equilibrium, the foreign government's behavior will have to be specified
analogously:

like the home country policy maker, it will not take world

market prices as parametric.
For the open-loop Nash equilibrium when both governments have access
to instruments for national lump-sum intergenerational redistribution and
to distortionary instruments such as capital rental taxes, interest taxes
or subsidies, and taxes or subsidies on foreign lending (borrowing), we
state the following proposition without proof.

Proposition 5
As in the static trade model, a noncooperative (open-loop Nash)
. equilib:cinm.,under. nationalistic policy making when national policy
makers have access to distortionary instruments yields a Pareto
suboptimal world allocation of resources, in this case capital.

If in the one active and one.passive country scenario the,home country

planner takes the lump-sum transfer scheme between foreign country
residents chosen by the foreign government as given, then the optimal
.choice of.policies by the home planner with preferences .defined only over
domestic residents' utilities as in equation (11) will include
distortionary taxes.

In conventional static multicountry trade theory the

optimal policy intervention for national welfare objectives is an optimum

°'•½
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tariff.

In this model all international trade is intertemporal so the

analogue of the optimum.tariff is a tax on private,foreign lending or
borrowing .. ·Such a tax equates the domestic rate of intertemporal product·
transformation.(1

+

the home country.marginal productiv.ity.of.capital)..with ....

. (1 + the rate of return to domestic residents -from claims ·-on foreign

capital).

The tax (the capital market equivalent to a tariff or export

tax) raises the foreign rate of interest paid to home country residents by
foreigners if the home country is a net creditor, or lowers the rate of
interest paid by domestic residents to foreigners if the home country is a
net debtor.
The optimum policy package for the home country utilitarian planner is
easily derived.

A convenient way of characterizing the optimum problem of

the domestic planner maximizing St (given in equation (11)) is by viewing
her as being able to choose directly for all i ~ 0 the domestic consumption
2
1
streams {ct+i , ct+i-l} and the stream of trade deficits {xt+i} subject to
the following constraints.
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(37) r*t+i -

*
f *'(kt+i)

= 0

Equations (32) and (33) are the resource constraints of the home
country and the foreign country respectively.

Equation (34) is the net

external asset accumulation equation for the home country.

Equations (35)

and (36) characterize competitive household equilibrium in the foreign
country. The world rate of interest r* equals the foreign marginal product
of capital.

Since the foreign government is passive we lose no generality

by omitting all foreign taxes.
each period,

r{ , r!_ 1 and the

The home government has three instruments
lending or borrowing tax.

These are

sufficient to allow it to choose as competitive equilibrium values of c{ ,
2
ct-J
and xt in each period any values of these variables that satisfy the

home country resource constraint given kt • The following conditions are·
satisfied in equilibrium:

(38)

and

, . The optimum .fiscal policy for the home government combines a foreign ·
lending or borrowing tax with an efficient unfunded social security scheme.
The domestic rate of interest equals the marginal productivity of home
capital.

35

Even if multilateral agreements restrict the use of standard
protective measures to gain national advantage in international exchange;-:-,-~-,-
scope for policy· intervention to raise-national social ··welfare at the
expense of foreign welfare -remains in the overlapping ·generations· model.
Suppose discriminatory taxes on capital income by source, investment
subsidies, taxes on international lending or borrowing and similar tax
incentives are eliminated by international agreements.

Because of the

absence of Ricardian neutrality, lump-sum transfer fiscal policies can
alter the expenditure plan for the home private sector.

Such intertemporal

expenditure ·switching can be used strategically by the government to raise
its national social welfare level at the expense of the foreign
government's welfare objectives.

Of course, if only lump-sum transfer

policies across households within each country are allowed, then the
resulting competitive equilibrium for the world economy yields a Pareto
optimal allocation unless it is dynamically inefficient.

Further, if

unrestricted age-dependent lump-sum transfers are feasible, balanced-budget
r.

... policies achieve. the same set of outcomes as do policies which involve

deficit-financing (subject to _the modified public sector solvency
constraint).

However with restrictions on the form of social security

retirement schemes a strategic role for the deficit policy of a government
with nationalistic social welfare objectives exists.
Ve now assume that the foreign:planner maximizes St* with respect to
his national unfunded social security policies at all dates, taking the
unfunded ·social.security plan of 'the home government·as fixed and that the
.home country government maximizes St.in the same manner.

An open-loop Nash

equilibrium in fiscal policies using only national balanced-budget lump-sum
transfer policies yields a Pareto optimal allocation with respect to
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household preferences, and a suboptimal one with respect to national social
planners' .preferences and with respect ,to the global- social welfare·
function.

Starting from a global social welfare optimum or from a national

social welfare Pareto optimum, if both governments aim to maximize their
•own national . social welfare through noncooperative strategfes, ·they c:will 1n ·
general select national lump-sum intergenerational redistribution policies
which cause deviations from the necessary conditions for a national social
welfare Pareto optimum or a global optimum.
Since the open-loop Nash policies we consider do not in general
support national command optima, the time-consistency of these policies is
not guaranteed. Ve ensure credibility "proforma" by endowing our
governments with compulsive honesty ("I cannot tell a lie").

Vhether these

policies can be supported with more general "punishments" or other trigger
strategies involving memory is an open question and beyond the scope of the
present paper.
Vithout fully characterizing the Nash equilibrium we can establish its
key properties .by ..considering the optimization problem for the home
government which maximizes St with respect to the sequence of domestic
lump-sum taxes and transfers {(r{+i , r!+i-l)i=O} (and taking as given the
*1

*2

w

sequence of foreign lump-sum taxes and transfers {(rt+i , rt+i-l)i=O}
subject to the following constraints:

(39)

, (40)

u' ( cti) - P(l

+

rt+i+J)u'(c!+i) = 0

1
f(kt+i) - kt+if' (kt"+i) - T t+i - 1

7

+

2
t+i

· 1
rt +H

1
= ct +i.

2

+

ct+i
1 + rt · 1
+H
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(41)

(42)

*1 - f3 *( 1
u*I (ct+i)

+

* *2
rt+i+1)u '(ct+i)

*
* *'(kt+i)
kt+if

*
-f*(kt+i)

*1
"t+i - 1

=0
'T

+

*2
t+i
rt+i+1

*1
= ct+i

+

*2
ct +i.
1
+ rt+i+1

(43)
*1

(44)

(45)

*2

ct+i-1

= ct+i + 1 + n

f(kt +i.)

+

kt +i. - (1

+

n) kt +i+
. 1

+

xt +i.

2
*2
"t+~1
*1
"t+~1
+ 1 + n = 0 and "t+i + 1 + n = 0 •
Equations (39)-(42) are necessary conditions for privately optimal

.
1
and balanced budget constraints "t+i

household consumption and saving decisions in both countries, while (43) is
the necessary condition for the foreign government's choice of fiscal
policy to achieve an efficient (in terms of the foreign national social
welfare function) foreign intergenerational distribution plan.

By-writing

. ,... .(43), we are not directly characterizing the Nash equilibrium in fiscal
policies. Ve instead use it to show that the necessary condition for a
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.national social welfare Pareto optimum will not be satisfied by the home
government's fiscal policy when the respective first-order-condition is
fulfilled by its foreign counterpart.
After some algebra, the necessary conditions for a constrained
national optimum include

=

j

[ [1

+ n ] i+
+ p

1

/(

j

)

u ct+i+l + 1t+i+1u

/ / (

1

ct+i+l

)
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* , qt+i , xt+i , xt+i
* and vt+i are the Lagrange
where 1t+i , 1t+i
multipliers for constraints (39, 41, 43, 40, 42 and 46), respectively. ·
vt + xt - xt* measures the change in the optimized value of the home country
national social welfare function brought about by a small increase in the
resources available to the home country in period t (which contributes vt
through the external asset accumulation equation (46)), effected by
increasing the resources available to generation tin the home country and
reducing the resources available to generation tin the foreign country by
that small amount (which contributes xt - xt* through (40) and (42), the
lifetime budget constraints of home and foreign generations

t). Since the

home country has unrestricted domestic intergenerational redistribution
*
instruments, vt + xt - ~twill
be nonnegative.
The solution implies that

and

That is if ht+i+l > 0 , then the- .noncooperative .national optimum lump"'.'asum .
fiscal policy for the home country reduces national saving (by
redistributing from the young to the old), and if ht+i+l < 0, the
noncooperative national optimum policy raises national saving beyond the
level that would be prescribed in a national social welfare Pareto optimum.
For example suppose that the initial capital stock is the same in the
two countries, that u

= u* and f = f * ,

but that the private discount rates
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differ.

Let the national social "generational" rates of discount coincide

, with the respective private time .preference rates. In.a Nash .equilibrium •
(either. closed- loop or open- loop), .the more-patient country~ s ·fiscal
authority raises social security retirement payments (hence, taxes on the
young), while the less patient country's government reduces social
security, relative to their respective cooperative equilibrium policies.
The government of the (patient) creditor country attempts to raise the
world rate of interest by reducing its national saving relative to the
cooperative level while the government of the (impatient) debtor country
tries to lower the world rate of interest by increasing its national
saving.

In the case described, the net result would be no net change in

the world rate of interest in the Nash equilibrium relative to the
cooperative equilibrium.

The frustrated attempts to achieve international

redistribution through changes in the world rate of interest, reflected in
1
*
values of rt+i
that are higher and values of rt+i
that are lower than the
cooperative values, result in inferior domestic intergenerational
H·.

,distributions .in the. two countries.
Ve summarize these results in Proposition 6.

Proposition 6
Nondistortionary (lump-sum tax) fiscal policy can be designed to gain
national advantage in international trade with respect to a
utilitarian national social welfare objective.

Nash equilibriums in

.,unfunded social security retirement schemes,.are.not J>areto efficient·
for national planner objectives but do attain equilibrium growth paths
which are Pareto optimal with respect to household preferences.
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Noncooperative selection of fiscal policies when distortionary tax

, .,_• '"

,, instruments are_ .unavailable creates no ,loss .,in total. ,world1 surplus for,.-/-,,••,
. households:

we stay on the world contract- curve (defined -with respect·,to·</ "'·

household preferences).

0

However noncooperative fiscal management·-ieads t-o -- ··

movements along this world contract curve.-·. Starting"from··a-national social
welfare Pareto optimum, the home country will choose to deviate from the
unfunded social security scheme necessary to support this plan in an
attempt to raise national welfare unilaterally.

This increase in utilities

for home resident households is at the expense of foreign residents.

No

overall distortion (in the individual Pareto sense) is created; the effect
of noncooperative policy selection with binding constraints on the use of
all distortionary taxes and subsidies is to redistribute welfare
internationally.
Because any unfunded social security scheme can be duplicated using
age-independent lump-sum transfers observing the modified public sector
solvency constraint, public sector debt management can be used to pursue
,

national gain jn international exchange if arbitrary age-dependent lump- sum
transfers are restricted.

Social security transfer programs and

deficit-financing of lump-sum fiscal policies can be used strategically to
promote national welfare objectives if Ricardian equivalence fails and
first- best (for the individual country) distortionary . policy instruments
are restricted.

5.

COORDINATION_ OF PUBLIC SPENDING PROGRAMS

Ve have shown that coordination of fiscal policies in the two-country
overlapping generations model is unnecessary for achieving a Pareto optimal
capital accumulation and consumption plan in the absence of distortionary
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taxes and subsidies, technological externalities and noncompetitive
-·- .behavior.

Free :international· capital tmobility allowing·:equalization .of·

,,••,,l, •• ~-~;

<

,,.. '><.: --

• ; rates of return to capital across borders,.is .adequate.to assure. efficiency.,.:,.--,u
if lump-sum tax policies are available to utilitarian planners in each

--•· country-. -The latter assures that a dynamically inefficient· path· is· not
followed.
In the absence of international technological externalities and
internationally consumed public goods, noncooperative lump-sum tax policies
chosen by utilitarian planners do not yield losses of world total surplus
(in terms of 'household preferences) in conventional competitive economies.
The adverse impact of the home country's policy on foreign welfare conveyed
through interest rate changes is not a technological externality but rather
a distributional consequence of economic interdependence through the
competitive price system that is a pure pecuniary externality.
In this section we add an internationally consumed public good to the
model.

Both governments contribute to the world public good supply which

is nonexcludable.andnoncongestible.

There is a case for international

coordination of exhaustive public spending on the national provision of
international public goods due to the presence of a technological
externality, but again financing policies do not necessarily require
coordination to ensure Pareto optimality with respect to private
preferences.
The consumption externality is introduced into the household utility
function in an additive separable manner. The utility function for the
home and foreign households are now
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.and

respectively.

v and v* are increasing, strictly concave, twice

continuously differentiable and satisfy the Inada conditions.
utilitarian national social welfare functions are unchanged.

The
For the home

country for example we have

As before we can restrict our attention to balanced-budget financing of
public expenditures with unrestricted age-dependent lump-sum taxes and
transfers, because adding the possibility of deficit-finance subject to our
modified public sector solvency constraint does not increase the set of
,.:.instruments..,,av:ailable4-tO the governments. The budget constraint for the
home government is
2
rt- 1
1
-rt - T+n

+ 9t = 0

and for the foreign government

*1 - 'T t

*2
r t-1

*

T+n + 9t = 0

where gt* and gt* are the public expenditures by each country at time t.
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Total supply and consumption of the public good is given by

In the definitions of utility for households we assumed that per capita
supply of the public good in terms of the number of current young in a
single country enters utility.

While the denominator is somewhat odd, this

measure of public good consumption is convenient because of the constant
population growth rate.

It also captures the notion of nonrivalness of

global public consumption goods vis-a-vis home country and foreign country
residents.
Consider again the case where the home country planner, in the pursuit
of national welfare, sets its. lump-sum taxes and exhaustive public spending
The foreign planner keeps the paths of its
3
lump-sum tax instruments and of its exhaustive public spending fixed.
in open-loop Nash fashion.

Home country national chauvinistic planner optimal public spending and
li:

. i•,unfwided .,sociaL,s.ecurit.y

policies,• disallowing distortionary tax

incentives, satisfy the necessary conditions

and
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where 'Yt is the shadow value of the constraint given in (51):
''"i' ·

,

competitive

hoine-icountry private' optimization·over consumption :plans '.'under free~ capital
0

mobility.
The sign of 'Yt for each t, is obtained from equations (48)-(50), which
are unaffected because of the separability of public goods in the utility
functions:

if equilibrium external lending is positive, then 'Yt is

negative, and conversely.

A creditor country government with utilitarian

objectives will wish to restrain saving and thus lending to the rest of the
world.

Since the social security scheme that reduces saving raises the

ratio of·consumptionwhile young to consumption while old, public good
provision is adjusted by the last term in equation (52) to correct the
marginal utility of private good consumption while young for this
distortion from the small country necessary condition for optimal
intergenerational transfers.
In the national chauvinistic uncoordinated world economy, public goods
are underprovided (or bads overprovided).
i1z; •.

•

The necessary condition for a

J>areta optimaLal-location of the public good is

where At gives the distribution of .welfare across national populations in
the particular Pareto optimum.

Coordination of spending policies is

required to ensure that (54) holds.

However, uncoordinated unfunded social

security schemes or-equivalent public expenditure financing policies do not
·interfere with the attainment of a Pareto optimum with respect to household
preferences.

As before, the use of social security schemes or
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deficit-finance (in the absence of unrestricted age-dependent lump-sum
't, .. ta:xes ·and.transfers) vto · gain.

advantage ,in·'international"cintertemporal·:•trade:s -

leads to an inefficient outcome with respect to national social welfare
functions but only has a distributional effect on aggregate household
welfare.

The use of lump-sum taxes to alter world interest rates and

pursue national intergenerational distribution objectives changes the
distribution of private (marginal utilities of) consumption across
generations. Vhile the Pareto optimal levels of provision of public goods
are affected by this, it does not cause a departure from Pareto optimality.

6.

CONCLUSION

In the absence of Ricardian debt neutrality, lump-sum transfers
between households within a country can be used by governments to attain
advantage in international lending and borrowing. The optimum policy for a
· utilitarian planner with nationalistic objectives facing a passive rest of
the world is a combination of a tax on foreign borrowing or lending and a
c. ._

.f.1,.sy:stem.. ;of,,cnat,ionaLintergenerational .lump- sum transfers.

The former is the.

intertemporal analogue of an optimum tariff and targets the world interest
rate, lowering it for a debtor and raising it for a creditor.

The lump-sum

fiscal policy targets the desired distribution of welfare over residents.
Thus with arbitrary domestic unfunded social security available, optimum
national policy towards international transactions is the same as in the
infinitely-lived representative agent. Vhen in addition to domestic
lump-sum unfunded social security distortionary instruments are available
to national policy makers, a noncooperative equilibrium in the world
economy leads to a Pareto inefficient consumption and production plan just
as in the static trade model.
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In an integrated world economy, when governments do not have access to
-,

distortionary tax instruments, lump-,-sum,-tax-.based -£.iscaLpolicy can ,be,,,u-sed--~--~
In this

strategically to improve a country's intertemporal terms of trade.

case, one instrument is used to optimize with respect to two goals, and a
trade-off exists between domestic intergenerational distribution and
international redistribution through interest rate manipulation.

Such

policies are nondistortionary in the world economy and cause no overall
welfare loss, but they do affect the distribution of welfare across
countries.
The·incorporation of exhaustive public spending through the provision
of global public goods introduces an allocational efficiency argument for
the coordination of fiscal policies.

However it is the coordination of

public spending across borders and not of the financing mixes to achieve
this spending that is required to achieve Pareto efficiency.
Interdependence of fiscal policies involves creates purely distributional
conflicts when only lump-sum taxes and transfers and deficits are involved.
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NOTES
1Separate tax-transfer schemes are tax-transfer schemes that are

balanced nation by nation i.e. that do not involve direct international transfers. Ve can widen this definition to include unbalanced public
sector budgets as long as one nation's public debt is serviced with taxes
on that nation's residents only.

Separate tax-transfer schemes can either

be coordinated or uncoordinated.

2 Ve adopt the notational convention that

0

IT

1
(1 + n)- (1 + ri) = 1

i=1
-1

and that

L/t

= 0.

t=O

3 Vhile it doesn't matter for the results that follow we can view the
fixed paths of foreign lumps-sum taxes to be in accordance with the
necessary conditions for an efficient intergenerational distribution plan
across foreign residents.

Foreign exhaustive public spending similarly can

be taken to be fixed at what would be the national Pareto optimal level for
some particular relative weight (A say) of foreign national social welfare
in the cooperative game.
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